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NOTES
Federalism Myth: States as Laboratories of Health

Care Reform
FERNANDO

R. LAGUARDA*

The late Justice Louis Brandeis once remarked on the benefit that our
system of government derives from the states acting as the "laboratories of
democracy."' This remark not only implies that states should be given the
discretion to experiment, it presumes that states actually have the ability to
do so. In order to understand Justice Brandeis and those who have
followed in his rhetorical footprints, it is important to understand federalism, which is the organizing principle of American government.
Ours is a system of layered government, with powers divided at national,
state, and local levels. Federalism provides the context for constitutional
interpretation and gives an understanding of the relationship among these
layers of government. Federalism is also a political language, albeit one
used for different purposes depending upon the motives of the speaker. As
a political language, federalism defines the parameters of government
activity, especially when national and state interests intersect. When Congress attempts to expand its authority, or states seek broader leeway to
develop policy, the courts must determine whether these actions can be
reconciled with basic principles of federalism. A proper understanding of
federalism is, therefore, essential to the proper functioning of government.
Much of the literature concerning "federalism" examines the intersection of national and local interests at the state level.2 However, one cannot
* J.D., Georgetown University Law Center, 1994; A.B., Harvard College, 1988. I would
like to thank my wife, Kate, for her encouragement and constant support. Professor Vicki
Jackson read an earlier draft and gave me the benefit of her insight. This note is dedicated to

the memory of my grandfathers, Carlos Frick and Raul Laguarda.
1. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). This
idea is popular in modern political rhetoric. See Clinton Selects Shalala for HHS; Reich is
Picked to Head Labor, STAR TRIBUNE, Dec. 12, 1992, at IA (quoting President-elect Bill

Clinton as saying that "states ...have often been laboratories of innovation"); Press Conference with President Bush, FED. NEWS SERVICE, Apr. 10, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis

Library, Fednew file (quoting President George Bush noting the importance of "[having] the
states be the laboratories"). However, states are not necessarily independent actors. See
Andrej Rapaczynski, From Sovereignty to Process, 1985 SuP. CT. REV. 341, 410 (noting that
states are historical-not economic-units, whose economies of scale and political incentives

weigh against independent activity).
2. See, e.g., DAVID OSBORNE, LABORATORIES OF DEMOCRACY (1988) (discussing the
significance of state experimentation); HEALTH POLICY REFORM IN AMERICA: INNOVATIONS
FROM THE STATES (Howard M. Leichter ed., 1992) [hereinafter INNOVATIONS] (discussing
health care reform at the state level). Such work is, however, often directed towards under-
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understand the nature of our federal system without examining the role of
states at the federal level, especially in the legislative process.3 This is
particularly so because the federal courts often refer to "federalism" when
they interpret legislation that affects the states. 4 Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's current framework for understanding federalism does not
recognize modern political realities, especially the role of states in the
legislative process.
This note argues that the Supreme Court misapprehends federalism.
Contrary to the Court's point of view, the political process itself does not
ensure that states can be the laboratories of democracy. Indeed, states are
at a distinct disadvantage; modern politics has eroded federalism's inherent safeguards, making imperative the Court's traditional role as its guardian. The Court has chosen to overlook the predominant role that modern
interest groups play in the legislative process, especially when states attempt social policy reform. As a result, the odds are stacked against states
expecting to serve as laboratories of democracy.
States should serve as "laboratories" of health care reform for two
reasons. First, health care reform is an issue of tremendous importance to
the states. States are major regulators, payers, and providers of care. State
electorates are concerned about obtaining health insurance and paying for
it. Second, and perhaps more significantly, the lack of reform is an impediment to politics at the state level. States responding to the health care
crisis are hindered in ways not readily apparent to the public. One commentator has noted that "[i]f anything, public perceptions are structurally
biased to underestimate health care costs." 5 This may exacerbate the gap
between rhetoric and reality, alienating citizens from elected officials.
standing whether "Ulunior may blow up his room with his chemistry set" without exploring
the importance of federalism as the context for state reform. Lawrence D. Brown, The
National Politics of Oregon's Rationing Plan, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1991, at 28, 31-32.
3. See generally Carol F. Lee, The Political Safeguards of Federalism? Congressional Responses to Supreme Court Decisions on State and Local Liability, 20 URB. LAW. 301 (1988).

Lee's article studies the response of states to several Court decisions that affected governmental operations. This note focuses on the potential for states to enact social policy. Here, the
objective is to show that structural impediments, including the Supreme Court's own view of
federalism, interfere with state discretion even when local constituencies pressure for
reform. The author is indebted to Lee for demonstrating how Congress responds to issues
that affect the functioning of state and local governments.
4. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 112 S.Ct. 2408 (1992) (invalidating federal law
requiring states to dispose of low-level radioactive waste); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S.
505 (1988) (upholding federal regulation requiring states to register bonds with U.S. Treasury); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (upholding federal grant requirement that
recipient states raise the legal age for purchasing alcoholic beverages).
5. PAUL STARR, THE LOGIC OF HEALTH-CARE REFORM 22 (1992). Starr notes that workers

generally don't know how much their employers pay for health care, how much these
expenditures are subsidized by tax deductions, and how much in public funds are spent on
health care in general. Id. Cf. Mike McNance et al., Health Care: Just Address the Bills to
CorporateAmerica, Bus. WEEK, Mar. 29, 1993, at 66 (discussing the subsidies provided by the
"Big Three" automakers for uninsured and publicly insured patients).
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States need to be effective laboratories to keep politics accountable to the
people. Most reform efforts, however, require congressional support.
In order to understand the modern realities of federalism, the Supreme
Court should examine the experience of states that are navigating the
legislative process. The Court's limited perspective is especially apparent
when states and interest groups both pressure Congress. Part I of this note
begins with a discussion of the significance of states as political actors in
the federal system. "The question of the relation of the states to the6
Federal government is the cardinal question of our constitutional system.",
The Constitution struck a careful balance between national and state
interests. The federal judiciary was largely entrusted to maintain this balance. Its role, however, was predicated on a view of politics in which states
far outweighed other constituencies. This view of politics is no longer valid.
Part II contrasts the constitutional framework with the Supreme Court's
view of federalism. 7 The preeminent decision of the modern Court addressing federalism, Garcia v. San Antonio MetropolitanArea TransitAuthority,8
is premised on the notion that states have significant influence in Congress. In Garcia, the Court indicated that states have influence as states in
the legislative process because of the structure of federalism and dismissed
the role of the judiciary in enforcing Tenth Amendment limitations on the
national "commerce" power. Responding to political reality, however,
states behave more like modern "interest groups" than sovereign entities
when dealing with Congress. The Court's federalism jurisprudence is insensitive to this modern trend.
Part III shows that this insensitivity is significant when considered in
light of the pressing need for social policy reforms at the state level,
especially in the field of health care reform, which is introduced as a
context for analyzing federalism. There is a significant amount of national
interest group involvement in the health care arena, and the political and
economic pressures are particularly acute at the state level.
Part IV examines proposals for health care reform in Hawaii and
Oregon, and the measures taken to secure congressional approval. These
case studies illustrate the inefficacy of the "political safeguards" envi-

6. WOODROW WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 173 (1908).
7. The Court's view is not always directly apparent because of the nature of the litigation
process. Alexis de Tocqueville wrote:
The makers of the federal Constitution relied on

...

private interest to attack the

legislative measure of which the Union might have complained.... Thus, ...
federal justice is at odds with state sovereignty; but it attacks it only indirectly, and
with reference to an application of detail. In this way it strikes at the consequences
of the law, not at its principle; it does not abolish but enervates it.
ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE,

DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA

Lawrence trans., 1969) (1850).
8. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).

148-149 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George
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sioned by the Court. This limited perspective stands in the way of the
reform process at the state level. States are not accorded the sort of
deference that the Supreme Court finds inherent in the structure of
federalism. Rather, the political process forces states to accommodate the
demands of competing national interests. This note concludes by arguing
for a new "jurisprudence of accountability" that properly recognizes the
important contribution that states can make to the federal system. A new
sensibility towards politics is called for. The Court should recognize its
responsibility to safeguard the political process and take seriously the fact
that state interests may not always be adequately represented in Congress.
I. THE POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF STATES

The first step toward understanding the role of states at the national
level is to examine federalism as an organizing principle of government in
American history. The earliest debate on this matter, essentially a debate
about sovereignty, was the one between the Federalists and the Antifederalists. 9
The Federalists directly challenged those who valued state autonomy.
By the end of the colonial era, the arguments in favor of independence
from Great Britain "indicate[d] that the idea of a political system comprised of constitutionally separate governments had taken strong hold in
America.""' Therefore, it was incumbent on the Federalists to show that
the new national government would not trammel upon the states. The
most effective way to do this was to argue that the states would most likely
have the upper hand in relations with the national government.' Indeed,
the Federalists portrayed Congress as being inherently2 amenable to state
interests because of the very nature of representation.'
The Antifederalists were skeptical of this description of the national
government as an equal "sovereign."' 3 They argued that the proposed
9. The name "Federalist" was used to identify the proponents of the new order. It was
derived from the title The Federalist,given by Alexander Hamilton to the collection of essays
authored by himself, James Madison, and John Jay in defense of the proposed constitution.
10. WALTER H. BENNETT, AMERICAN THEORIES OF FEDERALISM 37 (1964).

11. See THE FEDERALIST No. 31, at 196-97 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961) (arguing that states are more likely to encroach on the union than the union on the
states because states are closer to the people).
12. See THE FEDERALIST No. 46, at 296 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) ("A

local spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of Congress than a national
spirit will prevail in the legislatures of the particular States.").
13. There was much confusion at the time of the constitutional debate about the meaning
of the term "sovereignty." BENNETT, supra note 10, at 78. The Federalists argued that states
would only "surrender a portion" of their sovereignty to the federal government, while "retaining a considerable portion" for themselves. RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS'

DESIGN 53 (1987). However, Hamilton may have believed that the states never were completely "sovereign" in the first place. BENNETT, supra note 10, at 78. But see THE FEDERALIST
No. 39, at 245 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (noting that "the proposed
government.., leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty").
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constitution amounted to nothing more than a "strange hotch-potch"1 4 of
national and state interests, and that the national government would
eventually overwhelm the states. Without a clear distinction between these
two levels of government, they argued, "it would be contrary to the nature
of things that both should exist together."' 5 James Monroe, concurring in
these views, argued that in politics, as in physics, two powers cannot
16
occupy the same place simultaneously.
The end product of this debate, the Constitution, must be understood in
light of political reality as a compromise. 17 The federal government was
intended to coexist with independent, sovereign states. The text of the
Constitution did not include extensive procedural safeguards to delineate
the boundaries of state and national sovereignty because this coexistence
was assumed in the document.18 Instead, the Framers relied upon the
federal judicial branch to restrain the overreaching impulses of the national government.' 9 In this way, the Court ensured the fairness of the
political marketplace.2" Today, however, the issue of state sovereignty has
fallen by the wayside. Federalism, if it exists at all, is a procedural framework that relates to the political process. It is not a system that structures
relationships between and among sovereigns. 2'
14. A Letter of Luther Martin, in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS 171 (Cecilia M. Kenyon ed., 1985).
15. The Address and Reasons of Dissent of the Minority of the Convention of the State of
Pennsylvania to Their Constituents, in THE ANTIFEDERALISTS, supra note 14, at 27, 43. The
writers suggested that "as the sphere of their jurisdiction is undefined ... one or the other
would necessarily triumph in the [fullness] of dominion." Id.
16. BENNETT, supra note 10, at 81. William Grayson and Patrick Henry expressed similar
views at the Virginia ratifying convention. Id.
17. Madison attempted to broker objections to the Constitution by arguing that the
"source" of the new government's powers was both federal and national, deriving from state
representation in the Senate and popular representation in the House of Representatives.
Id. at 74. While the operation of its powers would clearly be "national," the "extent" (or
scope) of these powers was clearly limited and shared in the "federal" scheme. Id. at 74-75.
18. Indeed, the genius of American federalism, according to its most astute observer, is
that it struck a balance from the beginning, with state and national governments deriving
sovereignty directly from the people. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 7, at 157. Popular
sovereignty is evident in the mode of adoption of the Constitution and its concept of
representation, based on popular vote. BENNETT, supra note 10, at 53-54.
19. Berger argues that Hamilton specifically intended the courts to protect the states.
BERGER, supra note 13, at 166-67. Judicial review was to have a "primary role" in this
regard. Id. at 174. De Tocqueville also wrote that the Supreme Court was created to resolve
the limits of authority of the national government over the states. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra
note 7, at 115. See also BENNETT, supra note 10, at 85-87 (noting that FEDERALIST No. 39
(Madison) and FEDERALIST No. 28 (Hamilton) argue for the federal judiciary to resolve
disputes between the states and the national government).
20. John Hart Ely showed the importance of court intervention to protect individual rights

in a democracy.

JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST

(1980). This idea of proce-

dural fairness is used here merely to illustrate a role for the Court as arbiter between state
and national governments.
21. See Rapaczynski, supra note 1, at 359-68 (arguing that the sovereignty debate is
irrelevant to modern constitutional jurisprudence, which must instead focus on the process
of governance and recognize the dominant role of the national government).
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Although no one can say who most influences Congress, states themselves do not exercise significant power. There are several reasons for this
situation. First, the federal spending power has become increasingly impor-

tant.22 Congress's practice of attaching conditions to its grants to the states
has led to greater federal intrusion and a decline of state influence on the
federal government. 23 Second, political elites at the state level have fallen
in prominence. The rise of primaries to select party nominees for political
office has reduced the influence of state political parties and their leaders.2 4 The enactment of the Seventeenth Amendment opened the way for
Senators to play a more independent role in Congress. 5 In addition, the
national media now play an important role in shaping the tone of political
debate.26
22. The federal "spending power" is drawn from Article I, § 8 of the Constitution. Court
decisions have opened the door to the expansion of the spending power by dropping the
condition that its exercise further other enumerated powers. United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 66 (1936). See Herbert Jacob, Dimensionsof State Politics, in STATE LEGISLATURES IN
AMERICAN POLITICS 31-32 (Alexander Heard ed., 1966) (discussing federal funding and its

impact on states).
23. Lewis B. Kaden, Politics,Money, and State Sovereignty, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 847, 871-83
(1979).
24. See Charlotte Sarkowski, The People: Turned Off Politics, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,

Feb. 13, 1987, at 20 (discussing the decline of political parties, especially at the state level,
and noting the parallel rise of national interest groups); Tom Wicker, The Democrats'
Primary Problem, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, July 12, 1992, at 1D (discussing the demise of state
Democratic party organizations). Political parties in general "have come to be neglected by
the voters and politicians alike." Martin P. Wattenberg, Participants in the Nominating
Process: The Role of the Parties,in BEFORE NOMINATION 47 (George Grassmuck ed., 1985).

State Party leaders in particular have been displaced from the presidential nominations
process. See NELSON W. POLSBY, CONSEQUENCES OF PARTY REFORM 72-73 (1983) (including

the "proliferation of primaries" among the developments that
demise of state parties). The national conventions have become
enthusiasts" and do not purport to represent state party interests.
contributed to the weakening of party organizations by creating

have contributed to the
"dominated by candidate
Id. at 76. The media have
the "candidate-centered"

campaign. RONALD BERKMAN & LAURA W. KITCH, POLITICS IN THE MEDIA AGE 135 (1986).
See also RICHARD JOSLYN, MASS MEDIA AND ELECTIONS 269 (1984) (noting that "candidate

communication is definitely much less party-oriented now than it was in the first half of the
twentieth century").
25. There are two themes to the Seventeenth Amendment. The first is democracy, as
provided for by the direct election of senators. This was a clear break from the traditional
role of state legislatures. See Roger G. Brooks, Comment, Garcia, The Seventeenth Amendment, and the Role of the Supreme Court in Defending Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
189, 193 (1987) (noting that the indirect election of senators was intended to give states a
stronger voice in the national assembly; indeed, it was considered "a potent weapon of
self-defense" for the states). The second is state autonomy, as evidenced by the fact that
state legislatures retain discretion with respect to establishing voter qualifications and filling
senatorial vacancies.
26. With regard to politics, the mass media generally focus on coverage of national issues.
BERKMAN & KITCH, supra note 24, at 133. The mass media have become increasingly
important as voters let go of traditional loyalties at the local level. See id. at ix-x; see also
Garcia, 469 U.S. 528, 565 n.9 (Powell, J., dissenting) (arguing that national news media have
made Congress more attentive to "national" constituencies); see generally Robert J. Donovan
& Ray Scherer, Politics Transformed, WILSON Q., Spring 1992, at 19 (discussing the role
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, national interest groups have
become increasingly powerful forces because of the escalating cost of
running for office. 27 Although such groups often contribute much to the
policy debate, their extreme influence poses a unique set of problems to
the federal scheme. The Framers, whose primary concern was the threat of
regional factions and the danger of a permanent dictatorship of the majority, did not foresee that modern interest groups would transcend state
borders. These groups do not face the political and financial burdens
unique to state governments. They do not pass laws, nor claim to represent
a broad and open political community. Nonetheless, their influence cannot
be underestimated, especially in contrast to that of the states.
Madison's famous critique of direct democracy in Federalist No. 10 rests
upon an analysis of the dangers of "factions., 2' He argued in favor of a
"republican," or representative, form of government because he felt that
this scheme was society's best defense against factions. Madison described
a faction as a group "united and actuated by some common impulse ...
adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate
interests of the community.,' 29 He seems to have envisioned modern,
national interest groups. However, the factions of which he wrote were
primarily regional in nature, and the federal system was designed to
dampen their national effects. Madison noted that, although regional
interests "may kindle a flame within their particular States," the federal
system would prevent them from spreading "a general conflagration through
the other States." 3 In effect, Federalist No. 10 argued that the proposed
constitution would control the national effects of factions, especially as
represented by state interests.
In contrast to Madison's expectations, modern interest groups have
become sophisticated political actors that cross state lines. Congress is
under increasing assault by political action committees that seek concesof television in presidential elections since 1952, especially with regard to interpreting the
race at the state level); Donald L. Shaw & Shannon E. Martin, The Function of Mass Media
Agenda Setting, 69 JOURNALISM Q. 902 (1992) (noting how mass media enhance the forma-

tion of broad consensus across social strata).
27. For a general discussion of this activity, see Kenneth C. Smurzynski, Note, Modeling
Campaign Contributions: The Market for Access and Its Implicationsfor Regulation, 80 GEO.

L.J. 1891 (1992) (noting the significance of interest group influence and arguing for a new
approach to campaign finance regulation).
28. THE FEDERALIST No. 10 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

29. Id. at 78.
30. Id. at 84. From this source stems the argument that the Senate was designed to protect
states from each other. See infra note 52 and accompanying text. This note accepts the

Court's premise that states are directly represented in Congress, putting aside legislators'
individual policy preferences and the possibility of "cycling." Cycling is the phenomenon by
which an option preferred by the majority loses to a less preferred option, because of
intermediate votes on other options. This phenomenon, elucidated by modern public choice

theory, poses "a dramatic threat to the legitimacy of political decisions." DANIEL A. FARBER
& PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE 38 (1991).
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sions on almost every piece of legislation. An entire literature seeks to
explain the behavior of legislators who daily face this bewildering array of
supplicants.3" In light of this trend, and the accompanying political developments noted above, states have become less relevant to the legislative
process in Congress. Precisely for this reason, the Supreme Court can no
longer rely on the old "structural" notions that implicate an arrangement
of multiple sovereigns when it analyzes the federalism implications of
congressional legislation. Today, most real power is concentrated in Washington, D.C. It makes sense, then, to examine the state interaction with the
congressional legislative process.32 The safeguards that were established in
the Constitution to preserve the integrity of the states are no longer as
relevant, nor do they embody the type of deference to state interests the
Framers took for granted. Instead, the same ideals of federalism must be
guarded in the process of judicial decisionmaking. It is this very process
that the Supreme Court misunderstands.
II. THE SUPREME COURT'S FRAMEWORK
The Supreme Court set forth its vision of federalism in Garcia v. San
Antonio MetropolitanArea TransitAuthority.33 The case concerned a dispute
about the applicability of the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA)3 4
31. In the pluralist framework, political outcomes result from interest group accommodations. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION 46 (1988). See ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY 146 (1956)
(noting that "the making of governmental decisions is ... the steady appeasement of
relatively small groups"); V.O. KEY, JR., POLITICS, PARTIES, AND PRESSURE GROUPS 158

(1958) (describing the political process as the interaction among "groups, interests, and
governmental institutions that produce ... decisions."). Although in this light an interesting
argument can be made, "interest group theory" itself may not justify more intensive judicial
review. See Einer R. Elhauge, Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intensive Judicial
Review?, 101 YALE L.J. 31, 34-35 (1991) (pointing out the normative underpinnings of
"interest group" critiques, and arguing that judicial review is not necessarily better).
32. Principles of federalism are themselves significant to legislative interpretation. This
note does not argue that the Court should be concerned with states because they are like
interest groups. Rather, it argues that states attempt to influence politics like interest groups
because of the realities of federalism. Any realistic understanding of federalism must take
this into account.
33. 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The ardent tone of the dissenting opinions, combined with the
fact that three of the justices in the 5-4 majority (Brennan, Marshall, and White) are no
longer serving on the Court, may lead some to question the decision's longevity. But see Amy
L. Padden, Note, The Rehnquist Court and 5-4 Decisions: The Future of Stare Decisis in
ConstitutionalCriminal ProcedurePrecedentsAfter Payne v. Tennessee, 82 GEO. L.J. (forthcoming April, 1994) (arguing that the stare decisis impact of a decision should not be affected by
"vote counting").
34. The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) provided minimum wage and maximum
hour guidelines for employees engaged in commerce or in the production of goods for
interstate commerce. D. Bruce LaPierre, Political Accountability in the National Political
Process-TheAlternative to Judicial Review of Federalism Issues, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 577, 585
n.30 (1986). The FLSA, as passed in 1938, specifically exempted state and local government
employees. FLSA § 3(d), 52 Stat. 1060 (1938) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219
(1982)). In 1974, Congress extended coverage under the statute by redefining "employer" to
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to employees of state and local governments. 35 The dispute arose in the
context of another Supreme Court decision, National League of Cities v.
Usery.36 In Usery, the Court held that "the Commerce Clause does not
empower Congress to enforce the minimum wage and overtime provisions
of the Fair Labor Standards Act37...against the States 'in areas of traditional governmental functions.' ,
The Court later elaborated its test in a more formal manner in Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Association.38 The Court stated
the test in three parts. First, "there must be a showing that the challenged
statute regulates the 'States as States.' " Second, "the federal regulation
must address matters that are indisputably 'attributes of state sovereignty.' "
Third, "it must be apparent that the States' compliance with the federal
law would directly impair their ability 'to structure integral operations in
areas of traditional governmental functions.' ,3
In 1979, three years after Usery was decided, the San Antonio Metropolitan Area Transit Authority (SAMTA) challenged a Department of Labor
finding that its operations were not immune from the FLSA requirements.4"
Almost two years later, the district court granted SAMTA's motion for
summary judgment, holding that systems like SAMTA were integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions under Usery.41 The
Supreme Court reversed, overruling Usery in the process.4 2
include "a public agency," states, and their political subdivisions. FLSA, Amendments of

1974, §§ 6(a)(1), (5), (6), Pub. L. No. 93-259, 88 Stat. 58-60 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. §§ 203 (d), (s)(5), (6), (x) (1982)); LaPierre, supra, at 585 n.30.
35. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 533.
36. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
37. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 530 (citing Usery, 426 U.S. at 852).
38. 452 U.S. 264 (1981).

39. Id. at 287-88 (internal citations omitted).
40. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 534. After the Usery decision, SAMTA informed its employees that

it was relieved of its overtime obligations under the FLSA. Id. In fact, SAMTA had always
paid in excess of the FLSA minimum wage. Id. at 534 n.3. The Wage and Hour Administration of the Department of Labor then issued an opinion that SAMTA's operations were not
constitutionally immune from the application of the FLSA. Id. at 534. SAMTA sued the

Secretary of Labor in the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Texas, seeking a
declaratory judgment that Usery precluded application of the FLSA. On the same day,
Garcia and other SAMTA employees sued SAMTA in the same court, seeking overtime pay

under the FLSA. The court stayed Garcia's action, allowing him to intervene in the first case
as a defendant in support of the Secretary. One month after SAMTA sued, the Department
of Labor formally amended the FLSA regulations to explicitly provide no immunity to
publicly owned local mass-transit systems. Id.
41. Id. at 535. The Secretary of Labor appealed directly to the Supreme Court, pursuant

to 28 U.S.C. § 1252. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 535. During this time, the Court had decided United
Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R. Co., 455 U.S. 678 (1982), holding that commuter rail
provided by the state was not a traditional governmental function. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 535.

The Supreme Court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for further consideration in light of Long Island. Id. On remand, the district court held firm, differentiating
urban mass transit from railroads. Id. at 535-36.
42. Id. at 531.
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Writing for a 5-4 majority, Justice Blackmun noted that the test under
Usery was "unworkable" and "inconsistent with established principles of
federalism. ' 43 Congress, according to the Court, had gradually expanded
protection for state and local government employees under the FLSA. a n
The Court, in Maryland v. Wirtz, 45 had concurred with this expanded
protection, upholding the power of Congress to apply the FLSA to schools
to portray Garcia as the
and hospitals. Therefore, the Court attempted
46
logical next step in this sequence of events.
Garcia has come to stand for the principle that the federal system
provides inherent safeguards for states, obviating the need for federal
judicial intervention on their behalf.47 In this "structural" view, these safeguards are political in nature. There are two implications to this theory.
First, the Court considers the safeguards inherent in the arrangement of
federal powers because they are derived from the text of the Constitution.
The Constitution itself protects the role of states by reserving to states the
49
4
selection of Presidential electors the drawing of congressional districts,
and the control of electoral qualifications.5 ° The Court argues that these
procedural safeguards effectively protect states' interests. 51

43. Id. The opinion begins with a history of public transportation in San Antonio.
Originally privately operated, the system eventually came under public control. Id. The
Court notes that the public authorities came to rely heavily on federal financial assistance.
Id. at 532.
44. Id. at 533. Justice Blackmun's history of the FLSA amendments portrays a deliberate
process of extending protection to public employees. It is unclear whether the Court
considered the role played by states in the actual process of legislative deliberation.
45. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). But see id. at 205 (Douglas, J.,dissenting) (noting the untimely
demise of the Tenth Amendment). Usery overruled Wirtz in positing the "traditional functions"
test. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 533-34.
46. See Lawrence A. Hunter & Ronald J. Oakerson, An Intellectual Crisis in American
Federalism: The Meaning of Garcia, in ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL
RELATIONS, FEDERALISM AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (1987) (calling Garcia the "predictable
conclusion of some 50 years of judicial precedent").
47. "Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the delegated nature of
Congress' Article I powers, the principle means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of

the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Federal Government itself."
Garcia, 469 U.S. at 550.
2. For a contrasting view, see DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note
48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl.
7, at 133 (noting that presidential electors are not state "representatives" in any sense of the
word, but are instead much like a jury, remaining "unrecognized in the crowd" until they
must act).
1.
49. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl.
50. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl.1. See Garcia, 469 U.S. at 551 (stating that states are given
indirect influence over the presidency and House of Representatives by control of elector
qualifications).
51. Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552. But see id. at 565 n.9 (Powell, J.,dissenting) (noting that the
Seventeenth Amendment, the weakening of political parties at the local level, and the rise of
a national news media make Congress less representative of state and local interests and
"more likely to be responsive to the demands of various national constituencies"); see also
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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Second, the Court believes that these procedural safeguards benefit the
states in the legislative process. 52 The opinion cites various benefits, including general revenue sharing 53 and federal grants that account for a significant percentage of state and local expenditures.54 Additionally, states are
exempted from a number of federally imposed obligations.5 5 For these
reasons, argues the Court, the political process itself, rather than any
judicially construed standards, protects the interests of states.5 6
Garcia implies that states have significant leverage in the federal political system: "The political process ensures that laws that unduly burden the
States will not be promulgated."5 7 To the extent that the political process
restrains Congress from imposing burdens, states are afforded some degree of deference in the federal structure. Thus, Garciaimplies that states
are able to experiment as laboratories of democracy. More significantly,
Garciaimplies that states are meaningful political participants.

52. The Court notes that "state participation" is the "basic limit ... inherent in all

congressional action." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 556. In order to actually limit congressional
action, states must have significant political leverage. The Court, therefore, assumes that
states participate meaningfully in the legislative process. The clearest example of this would
seem to be the Senate, in which each state is equally represented. Although "[tihe principle
of state independence prevailed in the shaping of the Senate," it is an institution that
essentially protects smaller states from larger ones. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 7, at 118;
see also BERGER, supra note 13, at 174 (noting that equal representation was a compromise
to protect the small states from the large, according to Madison in Federalist No. 62); DE
TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 7, at 119-20 (stating that "there is such an irresistible force in the
legal expression of the will of a whole people that the Senate is very weak when faced by the
will of the majority expressed in the House of Representatives").
53. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. §§ 500-501 (1988) (revenue sharing provisions for federal lands).
54. One may question whether this is a sign of state strength or merely an example of
carrying water for the federal government. See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206
(1987) (validating conditional spending requirement attached to federal grant); see also
Drew Altman, Health Carefor the Poor, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci., July 1983, at
103, 113-15 (noting that the Reagan Administration used health block grants as a budget
cutting device). "With greater discretion but less ... money to finance health services for the
poor, many states face[d] hard choices" in assuring basic services while cutting costs. Id. at
115.
55. In fact, the Fair Labor Standards Act Amendments of 1985 provided states with relief
from some of the more onerous effects of the Garcia holding. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-216 (1988).
Congress also "barred damage suits against municipalities in the Local Government Antitrust Act of 1984," codified in 15 U.S.C. §§ 34-36 (1988). Lee, supra note 3, at 301.
56. A recent Supreme Court case may alter this characterization of the Garcia framework,
at least to the extent that direct federal action upon the states threatens political accountability. See New York v. U.S., 112 S.Ct. 2408, 2424 (1992) ("Accountability is thus diminished
when, due to federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance with the
views of the local electorate in matters not pre-empted by federal regulation."). However,
this note discusses state action in the federal arena.
57. 469 U.S. at 556 (dicta). But see Randy H. Hamilton, Local Self Government Through
Citizen Legislation: The Bedrock of Liberty, in ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IS CONSTITUTIONAL REFORM NECESSARY TO REINVIGORATING FEDERAL-

ISM? 22-24 (1987) (noting examples of federal usurpation of state government functions).
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III. HEALTH CARE REFORM
States are only one of the many political interests represented in Congress. The legislative process is not more inherently deferential to states
than it is to other interests, especially when Congress is considering policy
with the broad implications of health care reform. In this case, states are
"more like other interest groups, but without the money.""8 Unfortunately,
interests outside state borders are not concerned with the success of
laboratories of democracy, especially when care reform proposals have
national implications. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the realm of
health care reform.
States face many pressures to find an "answer" to the problem of access
to health care. Their responses are limited by the strictures of federal law,
especially the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
and the rules governing the Medicaid program. These constraints make it
necessary for states to cooperate with the federal government in order to
pursue reform. However, states lobbying Congress on health care reform
face the prospect of having to satisfy national constituencies and local
voters while devising policies that provide increased access to health care
at lower costs. This daunting task is not made easier by the politics of
reform, and by the uncertain climate facing states in Congress. 59
A. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF HEALTH CARE REFORM TO THE STATES

States are increasingly aware of the financial and political pressures to
address the health care crisis. 6 ° State budgets have been increasing steadily
for years, and continue to do so despite weakening revenues in a slow
economy. 6 In addition, states are a "major purchaser of health care
services" and devote about twenty percent of their budgets to health
programs.6 2 These costs include state employee benefits as well as other
58. Telephone Interview with Carl Volpe, Lobbyist for the National Governors' Association (Feb. 22, 1993).
59. Among the obstacles facing health care reform in this country, none is more formidable than the fact that the states and the federal government share responsibility for health
care but often have different agendas, serve different constituencies, and jealously guard
their respective prerogatives. Howard M. Leichter, Rationing of Health Care: Oregon Comes
Out of the Closet, in INNOVATIONS, supra note 2, at 117, 143.
60. "In 1991, the United States spent over $700 billion ... to provide health care services
[about 13% of GNP], while, by 1990, the number of uninsured people under the age of 65
had increased to over 33 million." GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCESS TO HEALTH
CARE: STATES RESPOND TO GROWING CRISIS 12 (1992) [hereinafter STATES RESPOND].
61. According to the National Association of State Budget Officers (NASBO), "[s]tates
raised taxes by record amounts in fiscal 1991 and fiscal 1992." NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, FISCAL SURVEY OF THE STATES: APRIL 1993, at 19 (1993) [hereinafter FISCAL SURVEY].
62. STATES RESPOND, supra note 60, at 15. States spent about $100 billion on health care
in 1991. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF RISING HEALTH
CARE COSTS 7 (1992). Health care is "the single most important cost driver" for states.
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public health programs, such as Medicaid.6 3 Because these costs have
become of increasing concern to the general public, state policy makers
are under considerable political pressure to "do something" about the
health care system. This pressure emanates from, and is manifested by,
campaigns for political office and coverage of the issue in the media.6 4 In
addition, interest groups are particularly active in this arena.65
Despite the efforts of state governments, private citizens have found it
increasingly difficult to obtain adequate health insurance or to keep their
coverage from eroding.6 6 Although some people qualify for subsidized

NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, 1992 EXPENDITURE REP. 2 (1993).
According to NASBO, Medicaid is the "most rapidly growing" state program, accounting for
"about 17 percent of all state spending in fiscal 1992." FISCAL SURVEY, supra note 61, at 15.
63. Medicaid is now the second largest budget item in many states, accounting for a
nationwide average of over 12% of total state expenditures in fiscal year 1990. GENERAL
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MEDICAID EXPANSIONS: COVERAGE IMPROVES BUT STATE FISCAL
PROBLEMS JEOPARDIZE CONTINUED PROGRESS 29 (1991) [hereinafter MEDICAID EXPANSIONS]. "Medicaid expenditures increased at a faster rate than general revenues in all state
categories." Id. (footnote omitted). NASBO expects Medicaid to account for 25% of state
spending by fiscal 1995. FISCAL SURVEY, supra note 61, at 15. According to one analyst, if
current trends continue, state Medicaid expenditures will have increased more than 480% by
the year 2000. Michael Tanner, As Washington Dithers, States Reform Health Care, BACKGROUNDER, Nov. 27, 1991, at 2 (Heritage Found., Washington, D.C.). In addition, rising
Medicaid costs are a major factor in "crowding out" other important state government
priorities, such as infrastructure, education, and tax relief. See NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
STATE BUDGET OFFICERS,

FISCAL SURVEY OF THE STATES: OCTOBER

1992, at 32 (1992)

(discussing the cost of the health care crisis, which continues to make it difficult to "fund
other priorities").
64. For example, many observers considered the Pennsylvania election of Harris Wofford
to the U.S. Senate a sign that voters were sending a message to government to put health
care at the top of the political agenda. See, e.g., CONG. Q. ALMANAC 350 (1992); INNOVATIONS, supra note 2, at xii (calling Wofford's election "a wakeup call to politicians").
65. A quick glance at a trade association guide reveals some 700 national "health care"
organizations, not including those with less descriptive titles that are nonetheless active in
the health care field. See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ASSOCIATIONS 2984-89 (Deborah M. Burek ed.,
27th ed. 1993). The health industry is already a major political player. Health-related
political action committees contributed $7.7 million to congressional candidates during the
first 18 months of the 1990 election cycle. Tim Brightbill, PoliticalAction Committees: How
Much Influence Will $7.7 Million Buy?, 21 INT'L. J. HEALTH SERVICES 285, 285 (1991). These
groups contributed over $10 million to Congressional candidates during the 1992 election
cycle. ContributionsBy Health-Care PoliticalAction Committees, WASH. POST, May 19, 1993,
at A9 (chart). The top recipients included Sen. Bob Packwood (R-OR) and Rep. Henry
Waxman (D-CA), two of the most outspoken members on health care issues. Id.
66. For most Americans, "health insurance coverage is a product of labor force
attachment." SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH AND THE ENVIRONMENT OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON
ENERGY AND COMMERCE,

103D CONG., 1ST SESS., MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK: BACKGROUND

DATA AND ANALYSIS 694 (Comm. Print 1993) (prepared by Congressional Research Service)
[hereinafter MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK]. About 64% of the population was covered by
employer-sponsored or union-sponsored health insurance in 1985. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HEALTH INSURANCE: AN OVERVIEW OF THE WORKING UNINSURED 10 (1989)

[hereinafter WORKING UNINSURED]. Health insurance is the most common benefit offered by
employers. Id. However, the "percentage of Americans covered by employment-related
health insurance has been declining." Id. at 2. The GAO notes that "[mluch of the recent
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medical care, 67 those who do not, primarily the working poor, are depen68
dent upon hospital emergency rooms to provide basic health services.
These costs are borne indirectly by consumers of private medical insurand by taxpayers, through tax
ance, through increased hospital rates, 69
activity.
hospital
charitable
for
exemptions
level, ' 70
In light of the "slow pace of decision making at the federal
growth in employment has been in industries and occupations where health benefits frequently are not sponsored." Id. at 2; see also id. at 11-12 (noting the reasons given by the
Congressional Research Service to explain the growth in the number of uninsured).
67. Those who qualify for public programs, such as the elderly, the disabled, and poor
children and their families face a distinct set of problems obtaining access to quality health
are uninsured." MEDICAID

care. "[A] disproportionate share of the poor and near-poor ...
SOURCE BOOK, supra note 66, at 694.

68. Emergency rooms provide a disproportionate share of health care to the uninsured.
Even though 14% of Americans were uninsured in 1990, they represented 19% of emergency
room patient volume. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS 26
(1993) [hereinafter EMERGENCY DEPARTMENTS]. Uninsured persons in metropolitan areas
are "most likely" to receive care in public and teaching hospitals. WORKING UNINSURED,

supra note 66, at 34; see also id. at 35-36 (noting that "the uninsured rely more heavily than
the rest of the population on hospitals for ambulatory services and as a regular source of
care"); Jack Hadley et al., Comparison of Uninsured and Privately Insured Hospital Patients,
265 JAMA 374, 378 (1991) (noting that when uninsured patients seek and obtain medical
services, their condition is generally worse than insured patients at the time of hospital
admission). For further analysis of the health condition of the uninsured, see generally M.
Susan Marquis & Stephen H. Long, Uninsured Children and National Health Reform, 268
JAMA 3473 (1992).
The rate of emergency room utilization among the uninsured is increasing. WORKING
UNINSURED, supra note 66, at 36. Eighty-one percent of hospitals responding to a recent
survey noted that, from 1985 through 1990, "uninsured people seeking nonurgent health
care" was the leading factor contributing to increasing emergency room visits. EMERGENCY
DEPARTMENTS, supra, at 19. Emergency rooms are designed to provide "unscheduled outpatient services to patients who need immediate medical care." Id. at 2. For a general overview
of emergency room protocol, see id at 12-16.
69. CBO Director Robert D. Reischauer notes that:
[S]ervices now received by the uninsured are paid for through various mechanisms.
Most hospitals are able to recover the bulk of these unreimbursed costs through
subsidies from state and local governments, other nonpatient sources of revenues,
and surplus revenues (or profits) from private payers. Surplus revenues from private
payers account[] for more than half of the recovery of unreimbursed costs.
CONGRESSIONAL

BUDGET OFFICE, STATEMENT

OF ROBERT D.

SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH, HOUSE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,

REISCHAUER

BEFORE THE

Mar. 2, 1993, at 19 [hereinaf-

ter CBO TESTIMONY]. Reischauer argues that workers bear the heaviest costs of employmentrelated health insurance in the form of lower real wages and reduced nonmedical fringe
benefits. Id. at 6. See also supra note 5.
70. Marilyn Moon & John Holahan, Can States Take the Lead in Health Care Reform?, 268
JAMA 1588, 1588 (1992). National reform is outside the scope of this note, which seeks
instead to examine state behavior in the federal context to determine the contours of state
discretion within the federal system. Demand for reform is acute at the national level.
Governor Robert P. Casey (D-PA) noted at a recent meeting of the National Governors'
Association that states should pursue their own reform efforts, given the absence of a
national plan, the lack of consensus on a reform package within the political parties, and the
harm of waiting for Congress to act. Dana Priest & Dan Morgan, Governors Hoping Clinton
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states have responded to these pressures in a number of ways. In the last
two years, twenty-three states have enacted or proposed legislation de71
signed to expand access to health care or to control health care costs.
States vary in the status of their respective reform
efforts and in the way in
72
which the programs would achieve coverage.
B. THE HEALTH CARE REFORM FRAMEWORK

Most plans to expand coverage for the poor and develop employer
mandates to bring health care services to the working uninsured have a
significant overlay with federal law and policy. This overlay often weighs
heavily against the prospect of real reform. 73 The two most significant

Won't Slow Their Health Care Changes, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 1993, at A4. The discussion in
Congress of President Clinton's reform proposals has not seemed to affect the sense of
urgency at the state level.
71. Priest & Morgan, supra note 70, at A4. Students of health law and policy tend to
mistrust state discretion. Frank J. Thompson, New Federalism and Health Care Policy: States
and the Old Questions, 11 J. HEALTH POLITICS POL'Y & LAW 647; see also Paul Torrens,
Health-Care Reform Takes Off in States, S.F. CHRON., Jan. 16, 1993, at A16 (noting that
AFL-CIO and IBM representatives doubt "whether state-by-state reforms were even the
right way to go [since] ... they might dilute efforts to develop better and stronger national
health insurance legislation"). Due to conservative economic tendencies, states are seen to
lack the commitment to reform. These tendencies are manifested in the "bid-down effect,"
which occurs when bordering states compete for business by lowering their tax burdens.
Thompson, supra, at 648. In addition, the Clinton Administration's rumored plans to give
states flexibility in implementing health care reform has caused some controversy. See
Elizabeth Neuffer, States Could Inherit US Health Woes, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 25, 1993, at 15.
Some observers worry that states may end up assuming too much responsibility, having to
ensure that all residents are covered while remaining within tight budget constraints. Id.
72. For example, Florida's recent Health Care and Insurance Reform Act of 1993 establishes Community Health Purchasing Alliances to guarantee health care under a voluntary
managed competition scheme. Governor Signs Comprehensive Bill Based on ManagedCompetition Model, 2 HEALTH L. REP. 570 (1993). In this type of scheme, groups of health care
providers "compete with each other in a framework that allows consumers to choose
intelligently among them and that encourages cost-conscious decision-making." STARR,
supra note 5, at 47. Vermont has established a state Health Care Authority to develop a
comprehensive plan and to set a global health care budget. National Academy for State
Health Policy, State Initiatives to Achieve Health Care Reform, in HEALTH CARE AT THE
CROSSROADS: REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING 23 (Briefing Book, Nat'l Ass'n Att'ys Gen.
Conference, May 4-5, 1993) [hereinafter N.A.A.G. Briefing Book]. Global budgets are
supposed to impose "hard" constraints on health care providers, but avoid overt rationing of
services. STARR, supra note 5, at 45. Washington's Health Services Act of 1992 contains
employer mandates and elements of managed competition. Washington Governor Signs Bill
CreatingNew Health Services Act, 1 HEALTH L. REP. 532 (1993); Moon & Holahan, supra note
70, at 1590.
73. See, e.g., Deborah A. Stone, Why the States Can't Solve the Health Care Crisis, AM.
PROSPECT, Spring 1992, at 51 (noting diminishing state autonomy under Medicaid, pressure
to "adequately reimburse" hospitals, and federal preemption). However, others note the
importance of state efforts despite these constraints. See, e.g., John E. McDonough, States
First: The Other Path to National Health Reform, AM. PROSPECT, Spring 1992, at 61 (noting
the value of local initiative and the significance of the taxing power in setting up incentives).
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overlays are discussed below in order to establish the federal "context" in
which states must operate to enact health care reform.
1. ERISA and State Reform Efforts
State strategies to finance health care for the uninsured face a "formidable barrier ' 7 4 in ERISA.7 5 The law was designed to ensure the solvency
of private pension plans. Enacted "as a response to pension fraud and
mismanagement, ' ,76 its regulatory scheme applies to employee benefit
plans established by any employer "engaged in commerce" or "affecting
commerce." 77 The statute does not influence the content of any plan,
except to require an eighteen-month extension of group rates to former
employees and dependents. 78 Its wide mandate, combined with significant
flexibility, makes self-insurance under ERISA an attractive option for
employers. When it was passed, very few health plans were self-insured.
Now, some observers estimate that more than half of all employees with
private health insurance are enrolled in self-insured plans. 79 These employees are effectively isolated from state reform efforts.
ERISA was passed to regulate employee benefit plans, but it contains a
preemption clause that has been interpreted to grant very little room for
state regulation. Section 514(a) provides that "[e]xcept as provided...
[these] provisions.., shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they
may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in

74. Karl Polzer, The Role of Federal Standards in Health Systems Reform: How Much
Leash Should ERISA Give the States? 1 (Nov. 18, 1992) (unpublished issue brief No. 609,

The George Washington University National Health Policy Forum, on file with The Georgetown
Law Journal).
75. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (1988 & Supp. III 1991).

76. Patricia A. Butler, Taxing Choices: ERISA and State Health Care Financing Strategies 3 (Aug. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, National Academy for State Health Policy, on
file with The Georgetown Law Journal).

77. 29 U.S.C. § 1003(a) (1988). ERISA applies to employee pension benefit plans and
employee welfare benefit plans, including those plans established by an employer to provide
medical care, through the purchase of insurance or other methods. 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1), (3)
(1988). The law provides for disclosure to employees and reporting to the federal government; eligibility, participation, and vesting rules; funding and fiduciary standards; and a

federal insurance system to fund insolvent pension plans. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021, 1052-53,
1081-86, 1101-14, 1301-09 (1988).
78. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1161-68 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (commonly known as the "COBRA"

requirements).
79. Employer-sponsored plans now benefit over 60% of the nation's population. Oversight
Hearingon the Effect of ERISA Preemption on State Health Care Reform Before the Subcomm.
on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 103d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1993) (testimony of Robert S. Stone, chairman, ERISA Industry Committee)
(unpublished hearing, on file with THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL) [hereinafter Oversight
on ERISA Preemption]; see also GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ACCESS TO HEALTH
INSURANCE: STATE EFFORTS TO ASSIST SMALL BUSINESS 17 (1992) (estimating that 56% of

all employees work for firms that self-insure).
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section 1003(a) of this title and not exempt under section 1003(b) of this
title." 8 ° The courts have interpreted ERISA to forbid states from requiring
employers to provide health insurance,8" regulating the terms and conditions of self-funded employee health plans,8 2 and taxing plans to fund
high-risk pools or other initiatives.8 3 In addition, a recent federal court
decision appeared to jeopardize states' ability to finance services through
rate-setting or health care provider taxes.8 4 This case was, however, reversed.8 5
The law's comprehensive regulatory scheme makes it very difficult for
states to expand access to health care by regulating employer-provided
health benefits. 86 In addition, Congress has shown little willingness to
amend the law to provide flexibility to states. State strategies to expand
access to health care run counter to the political realities in Congress. For
example, when Massachusetts was formulating its health care reform plan,
Governor Michael Dukakis was forced to recognize that requesting an
ERISA waiver from Congress was politically infeasible.8 7 Similar political
constraints influenced Oregon's reform strategy as well. 8

80. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (1988). Exemptions include state laws regulating insurance,
banking, and securities; state criminal law; the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act as it existed
in 1974; and various other state laws. States are prohibited, however, from deeming employer plans to be "insurance" for the purpose of regulation. See Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
Inc. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
81. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 442 F. Supp 695 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d
760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
82. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
83. Bricklayers Local No. 1 v. Louisiana Health Ins. Ass'n, 771 F. Supp. 771 (E.D. La.
1991).
84. United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health and Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hosp., 793 F. Supp. 524 (D.N.J. 1992).
85. United Wire, Metal & Mach. Health and Welfare Fund v. Morristown Memorial
Hosp., 995 F.2d 1179 (3rd Cir. 1993). Nonetheless, the dissent noted it was "a close case,"
relying heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Pilot Life Ins. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41
(1987). United Wire, 995 F.2d at 1196, 1197 (Nygaard, J., dissenting).
86. See case studies infra Part IV. For a thorough discussion of the ERISA issue in
particular, see Mary Anne Bobinski, Unhealthy Federalism:Barriersto IncreasingHealth Care
Access for the Uninsured, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 255 (1990) (analyzing the effect of ERISA
preemption on state efforts to address the health care "crisis"). At the time of its passage,
ERISA was seen as a step towards national health reform. See Oversight on ERISA Preemption, supra note 79, (statement of G. Lawrence Atkins, Association of Private Pension and
Welfare Plans) (arguing that ERISA's preemption of state laws reflected "the considered
judgment of the framers of ERISA about the best means to protect and encourage the
growth of employee benefits"). However, ERISA has since become one of the more formidable obstacles to reform at the state level. See id. (opening statement of Rep. Williams,
Chairman of the House Subcomm. on Labor-Management Relations) (noting that the lack of
"state experimentation" in the health care field may be attributed to "ERISA and its broad
language overriding state laws").
87. STATES RESPOND, supra note 60, at 38 (reporting that the waiver would have allowed
the state to require that employers provide health insurance to their workers).
88. Id. at 44. Oregon's plan included an employer "play-or-pay" scheme. Id. at 39.
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2. Medicaid and State Reform Efforts
The Medicaid program evolved in the late 1960s from a patchwork of
state and federal social welfare programs.8 9 The new legislation gave states
"substantial latitude to design their own programs, so long as they met
minimum Federal standards." 90 The federal government shares the cost of
each state's program. 9' Medicaid is the largest federal program for lowincome individuals and the largest grant-in-aid program to state and local
governments.9 2 Medicaid is a series of programs that vary from state to
state. State participation is optional, but each state that participates must
provide a minimum level of services. 93 Beyond that, states have options as
to the population covered, the scope of services offered, and the terms of
reimbursement. 94
Approximately thirty-one million people received Medicaid benefits in
1992, at a combined cost to federal, state, and local governments of over
95
$118.8 billion-fifteen percent of total national health care spending.
Most beneficiaries qualify for services as a result of receiving Supplemen97
to7
96
tal Security Income, or Aid to Families with Dependent Children. As
89. Medicaid was enacted in 1965, replacing vendor payment programs for welfare recipients and the Kerr-Mills medical assistance program for the aged. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 66, at 26; see also GEORGE J. ANNAS ET AL., AMERICAN HEALTH LAW 165 (1990)

(describing the origins of Medicaid).
90. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 66, at 29; see also Eleanor D. Kinney, Rule and
Policy Making for the Medicaid Program: A Challenge to Federalism, 51 OHIO STATE L.J. 855,

857 (1990) (noting that Medicaid "permits great diversity among state programs").
91. The federal share for medical services ranges from about 50% to almost 80%; the
overall share is about 57%. It is derived from a formula based on each state's per capita
income. 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1988); 42 C.F.R. § 433 (1992) (outlining formula for federal
medical assistance payment); see also MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 66, at 480. At the
time of Medicaid's enactment, it was thought that per capita income would reflect the
standard of living in each state, and therefore reflect the state's relative need for Medicaid
services. Some analysts may question the equity of this formula because it does not reflect
the greater tax burden in states with a high proportion of needy residents, nor does it take
into account each state's ability to fund Medicaid from its own revenue. Id. at 481.
92. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 66, at 472 n.2, 473.
93. Title XIX of the Social Security Act outlines: (1) mandatory services a state must
provide in order to participate; (2) optional services a state may choose to provide; and (3)
payment and service provider modifications for which states must seek special federal
approval. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396-1396s (1988 & Supp. III 1991).
94. ANNAS ET AL., supra note 89, at 166. States must adhere to four basic requirements with
regard to optional services: (1) each covered service must be sufficient in "amount, duration,
and scope" to achieve its purpose; (2) each covered beneficiary must receive comparable services; (3) generally, the plan must be in effect statewide; and (4) beneficiaries must be free to
choose from among qualified providers. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 66, at 15, 18.
95. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 66, at 1.
96. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-1383c (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
covers the aged, blind, or disabled.
97. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-617 (1988 & Supp. III 1991). Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC) assists low-income parents with children. AFDC recipients comprised
45% of total beneficiaries in fiscal year 1991, and SSI recipients comprised another 16%.
MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 66, at 6.
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health insurance, Medicaid is the third most important source of coverage
in the United States. 98 It is by far the most significant source of coverage
for people living below the poverty level. 99 However, the program covers
only thirty-six percent of poor adults aged eighteen through sixty-four, and
substantially fewer of the total number of poor single adults and childless
couples.'0° Medicaid is also the "largest source of third-party funding for
long-term care,"' 0 ' almost all of which is spent on nursing home care for
the elderly.' 0 2
State Medicaid programs are under increasing pressure from two sources.
First, the scope of services covered has become a subject of increasing
controversy in recent years as states seek to control their budgets. Since
1980, Congress has passed over thirteen measures affecting the Medicaid
program, seven of which expanded the program to cover more persons and
provide more benefits.'0 3 These actions have contributed to increasing
program enrollment and increasing costs. 0 4 Second, the cost of medical
services has been increasing faster than the general rate of inflation.0 5

98. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 66, at 47-48. Employment-based coverage and

Medicare are the two largest sources of health insurance coverage. Id.
99. Id. at 49. In 1991, Medicaid covered almost half of those below the poverty line, and of
those remaining, Medicare covered 30%, and 20% were uninsured. Id.
100. Id. at 50.
101. Id. at 59. Medicaid paid for almost half of all nursing home care in 1990. Medicare,
private insurance, and other government programs combined paid for only 10%. The
remainder was covered by out-of-pocket expenditures. Id. at 60.
102. Almost two-thirds of the people needing long-term care and living in institutions are
sixty-five years of age or older. Id. at 811.
103. The Deficit Reduction Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, 98 Stat. 494, "[e]liminated
categorical tests for certain pregnant women and young children"; the Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82, "[e]xtended
coverage to all pregnant women meeting AFDC financial standards"; the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, 100 Stat. 1874, "[alllowed coverage of
pregnant women and young children to 100 percent of poverty"; the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1320, "[a]llowed coverage of
pregnant women and infants to 185 percent of poverty"; the Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-360, 102 Stat. 683, "f[mandated coverage of pregnant
women and children to 100 percent of poverty and [e]xpanded coverage of low-income
Medicare beneficiaries"; the Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat.
2343, "[e]xtended work transition coverage for families losing AFDC because of increased
earnings and expanded coverage for two-parent families whose principal earner was
unemployed"; the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103
Stat. 2106, "[m]andated coverage of pregnant women and children under age 6 to 133
percent of poverty"; the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508,
104 Stat. 1388, "[p]hased in coverage of children ages 6 through 18 to 100 percent of poverty
[and] [e]xpanded coverage of low income Medicare beneficiaries." MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK,
supra note 66, at 27-28. These expansions have primarily benefitted children.
104. Program enrollment has been increasing at an average annual rate of approximately
8% from 1989 to 1992. Id. at 44.
105. Id. The price of medical services measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI) has
increased 71% faster than the general rate of inflation from 1989 to 1992. Id. According to
the Director of the Congressional Budget Office, these statistics are not inherently reliable,

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 82:159

This has fueled public anxiety over the cost of government-funded health
care.
As a result of these pressures, states are "increasingly willing to cut back
on Medicaid coverage, to impose cost sharing requirements on recipients,
and to utilize a variety of restrictive administrative techniques ' 10 6 to limit
the availability and use of services. Furthermore, Medicaid's welfare constituency makes it vulnerable to public criticism. 1 7 Program beneficiaries
are "mostly unorganized, politically unsophisticated, and of little electoral
consequence." ' 0 8 Meanwhile, states are studying the Medicaid program in
the "context of proposals to provide government health insurance for the
uninsured."1 0 9 These efforts allow states to capitalize on federal reimbursement for local health initiatives. Consequently, there is significant pressure
to maximize coverage while keeping state costs as low as possible. This
pressure results in a poor distribution of cost-cutting measures among the
program's beneficiaries.
The primary mechanism for states to retool the Medicaid program is to
obtain an administrative waiver from the federal government. Waivers
allow "states to experiment with different approaches to financing and
delivering health care services and also to meet the particular needs of
special groups of beneficiaries. ' " Generally, there are three types of
waivers: so-called "freedom of choice" waivers, which include authority for
home and community-based
primary care case-management systems;'
long-term care waivers;'12 and "demonstration" waivers for novel state
since the CPI "does not measure the total costs of medical care, but only the consumer's
out-of-pocket expenses, which have declined significantly over the past 30 years." CBO
TESTIMONY, supra note 69, at 13. However, the CPI trend may contribute to a general, public

perception that medical costs are "out of control."
106. ANNAS ET AL., supra note 89, at 167.
107. See Kinney, supra note 90, at 857 (noting that President Ronald Reagan "was able to

achieve substantial cutbacks in [Medicaid] because of public and congressional perceptions
that [it] was a welfare program").
108. Brown, supra note 2, at 32. This characterization is most applicable to the AFDC-

eligible population.
109. Kinney, supra note 90, at 859 (citation omitted).
110. Id. at 873.

111. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(b)(1) (1988). There were forty-four such waivers in effect in
November 1992. Telephone Interview with Mike Fiore, Program Analyst, Health Care

Finance Administration (Feb. 19, 1993). The program has four basic components. First,
states may create a primary care case-management program through which each beneficiary
selects or is assigned a single provider. This is the most popular component. Second, states

may require beneficiaries to choose from a limited selection of health plans in a given area.
Third, states may provide additional services to managed care enrollees as a means of
"sharing" the savings. Finally, states may restrict the providers from whom beneficiaries
receive services. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 66, at 376. Of 120 requests submitted

by states from 1981 through January 1991, only 59 were approved-most of them for
case-management programs. Id. at 377.
112. 42 U.S.C. § 1396n(c) (1988).

1993]

HEALTH CARE REFORM AND FEDERALISM

experimental programs.1" 3 As is the case with ERISA waivers, however,
states face formidable obstacles when they attempt to obtain Medicaid
waivers from Congress.
IV.

FRUSTRATED FEDERALISM: EFFORTS TO EXPAND HEALTH CARE

This Part examines proposals for health care reform that were advanced
by Hawaii and Oregon. These case studies suggest that the Garcia framework is faulty. Hawaii sought an exemption from ERISA, and then requested more flexibility under the law. Oregon sought to modify its
Medicaid program to expand coverage to the uninsured. Both states lobbied Congress to approve their requests, ultimately without success. 14
These efforts show the limits of the Supreme Court's view of federalism in
the legislative process. Hawaii and Oregon both argued that they should
be allowed to serve as "laboratories" for the nation, but this argument only
aroused opposition in Congress.
A. THE HAWAII PREPAID HEALTH CARE ACT

Hawaii enacted one of the first comprehensive health care plans in the
country in 1974.15 When the federal courts determined that the plan had
been preempted by ERISA, the state's congressional delegation sought
relief from Congress. Hawaii eventually obtained a waiver, but it was
forced to abandon any pretense of serving as a model for national reform.
Since the waiver limited Hawaii to its health plan as it existed in 1974, the
state continued to seek expanded flexibility from Congress. The state's
arguments reveal the difficult process of negotiating among national interest groups in Congress. On the one hand, members of the delegation noted
the importance of states like Hawaii serving as models for national health
care reform. On the other hand, however, sensitive to the interests of
113. Several statutes give the Secretary of Health and Human Services the authority to
conduct demonstration projects. The most significant of these is Section 1115(a) of the
Social Security Act. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra note 66, at 418. This provision allows
the Secretary to waive any part of the Medicaid law for demonstrations that will "assist in
promoting the objectives" of the program. Such waivers are usually granted for research
purposes, and must include formal research or an experimental methodology, and provide
for independent evaluation. Generally, these waivers are limited in scope and may only run
for three or four years. Id. In addition, Congress has "periodically mandated specific
demonstration projects or special waivers in legislation." Id. at 422. For an overview of one
demonstration, see Lu Ann Heinen et al., Findingsfrom the Medicaid Competition Demonstra-

tion: A Guide for States,

HEALTH CARE FINANCING REV.,

Summer 1990, at 55 (evaluating a

program intended to test innovations such as limiting total provider payments, and implementing case-management and provider competition).
114. Oregon's plan eventually received a limited waiver from the Clinton Administrationafter undergoing several revisions. See infra Part IV.B.2. This issue is, however, outside the
scope of this note, which is concerned with the structural safeguards of federalism as they
relate to Congress.
115. Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act, HAW. REV. STAT. § 393 (1988).
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business and labor, they argued that Congress should address the technical
problems caused by a waiver that saddled Hawaii permanently with a
health program designed for 1974.
This example shows the limits of the Supreme Court's view of the
legislative process in two ways. First, when Hawaii sought to serve as a
national model, it triggered intense opposition from interest groups. The
state's congressional delegation had to narrow its argument to the point of
abandoning any pretense of serving as a "laboratory" for health care
reform. Second, the process through which the proposal obtained congressional approval could not easily be distinguished from most other legislative battles. State-based reform is just as dependent on the political process
and external political factors as are other legislative proposals.
1. The Basic Employer Mandate
6
Hawaii has moved "closer to universal access than any other state."'
This is primarily because of the state's unique exemption from ERISA
strictures.1" 7 Hawaii's "Prepaid Health Care Act" provides for mandatory
"statewide, employer-based, comprehensive ...insurance."' 8 Every employer is required to provide health insurance to its workers, and employees must share financing of premiums unless they have comparable coverage
from another source."i 9 The state provides access to health care for the
1 20
and a stateremaining population through a combination of Medicaid
2 1 In general, the Hawaii system has been
subsidized insurance program.
to health services than is
credited with providing greater ease of access
22
available to the U.S. population as a whole.1
The Prepaid Health Care Act took effect in June of 1974, making
Hawaii the first state in the country to provide a "comprehensive scheme
116. STATES RESPOND, supra note 60, at 24. Estimates of the number of uninsured in
Hawaii range from 3% to 7% of the total population. About 8.1% of Hawaii's population
under the age of 65 was uninsured in 1989. Id. at 26 n.5.
117. According to the General Accounting Office, the exemption is the "key factor that
enabled Hawaii to fashion its approach to universal access." Id. at 30.
118. 126 CONG. REC. S20,243 (1980) (statement of Sen. Matsunaga), reprinted in ERISA:
Exemption from Preemptionfor Hawaii PrepaidHealth CareAct: HearingsBefore the Subcomm.
on Labor-Management Relations of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 97th Cong.,
2nd Sess. 120 (1982) [hereinafter 1982 House Hearings].
119. STATES RESPOND, supra note 60, at 25. Employers choose between two plans: a basic
option that includes dependent coverage, or a more extensive plan that only covers employees. Id.
120. In 1990, about 73,000 people were insured through Medicaid in Hawaii. Id. at 26.
121. Hawaii enacted the State Health Insurance Program (SHIP) in 1989 "to provide
state-subsidized private health insurance for the low-income uninsured." Id. at 26. The
target population includes traditionally uninsured groups, such as the unemployed and
under-employed. Id. The SHIP benefit package is "heavily weighted toward preventive and
primary care, with full coverage for prenatal, well-baby, and well-child physician visits." Id.
at 27.
122. Id. at 27.
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of mandatory employee health insurance."' 123 At the time, advocates of the
legislation "saw themselves not so much as bold innovators but as anxious
to join what they viewed as ...impending national [reform]." '1 24 In September of that year, Congress enacted ERISA. 1 25 Two years later, Hawaii
expanded the standard benefits package under the Act to include the
diagnosis and treatment of drug and alcohol abuse. 126 The Standard Oil
Company, a Hawaii employer, challenged the applicability of the Act to
self-insured employers, 127 and in 1981 the Supreme Court agreed that
law. 1 28 By that time, Hawaii had already turned to
ERISA preempted state
29
Congress for relief.1
Throughout debate of the state's request, business interests consistently
argued that Congress should consider an exemption "only in the context of
national health legislation.' 130 They argued that the Hawaii law on its own
would "detract from the coverage already provided by multistate
employers." '3 1 Employers were particularly alarmed at the prospect of
other states adopting the Hawaii model because it would prevent multi-

123. 1982 House Hearings, supra note 118, at 11 (statement of David Peters, representing
Sen. Inouye). A 1969 statewide study found that approximately 29% of the population was
uninsured and recommended the enactment of an employer-based system to provide group
medical coverage for employees. Id. at 4 (statement of Rep. Akaka).
124. Deane Neubauer, Hawaii: The Health State, in INNOVATIONS, supra note 2, at 147,
156.
125. See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
126. See Act of Apr. 28, 1976, ch. 25, 1976 HAW. SESS. LAWS 28 (amending HAW. REV.
STAT. § 393-7(c)(6)(1988)).
127. Standard Oil employees in Hawaii participated in the company's self-funded health
plan, which did not provide substance abuse treatment. The company sought to enjoin the
state from enforcing the new requirement. 1982 House Hearings, supra note 118, at 92
(statement of Sen. Matsunaga). The district court found that, although there was no
evidence of Congressional intent to preempt state laws with regard to health insurance, the
broad language of ERISA preempted all state laws relating to private employee benefit
plans, including Hawaii's Prepaid Health Care Act. Standard Oil Co. of Cal. v. Agsalud, 442
F. Supp. 695, 706 (N.D. Cal. 1977), aff'd, 633 F.2d 760 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 454 U.S. 801
(1981).
128. Agsalud, 454 U.S. 801 (1981).
129. In 1977, Senators Matsunaga and Inouye introduced S.1383, which would have
exempted all state health insurance laws from ERISA. 1982 House Hearings,supra note 118,
at 93 (statement of Sen. Matsunaga). The Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources approved a measure that would have amended ERISA to exempt the Hawaii Prepaid
Health Care Act, as well as "any other State law determined to be substantially identical to
... the Hawaii law." Id. at 93. Responding to heavy opposition from the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers, Senator Matsunaga amended the
bill to exempt only the Hawaii law. Id. at 93. The bill failed to pass, and was reintroduced in
the two succeeding Congresses. Id. at 93; see also Daniel M. Fox & Daniel C. Schaffer,
Health Policy and ERISA: Interest Groups and Semipreemption, 14 J.HEALTH POLITICS POL'Y
& LAW 239, 247 (1989) (discussing interest group opposition from the national AFL-CIO,
business groups, the ERISA Industry Committee, and the American Council on Life Insurance).
130. 1982 House Hearings, supra note 118, at 96 (statement of Sen. Matsunaga).
131. Id. at 93.
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state employers from "providing a uniform compensation package for their
workers nationwide." 132 Senator Matsunaga responded that the Hawaii
law set minimum standards that were "generally lower than the benefits
already extended to workers by multistate employers." 1 33 Further, he
noted, inaction would
"strip health insurance coverage from thousands of
1 34
Hawaii."
in
workers
After prolonged efforts by its congressional delegation, the state in 1983
finally obtained congressional approval to exempt the Hawaii Prepaid
Health Care Act from ERISA. 1 35 Hawaii's senators in particular had made
"restoration of the state's Prepaid Health Care Act one of their highest
priorities. 1 36 Focusing on congressional intent in the original ERISA
legislation, 137 the delegation outmaneuvered its opponents. However, the
exemption applied to the Act only as written in 1974, precluding substantive amendments. The law contained a strict statement designed to placate
those who were concerned that Congress was setting a precedent with
regard to a national model. 38 Hawaii's efforts, wrote two commentators,
"revealed the strength of the interests that had coalesced to protect
ERISA preemption and made plain the stakes of any effort to change it."' 3 9

132. Id. at 93; see also Fox & Schaffer, supra note 129, at 247 (noting that staff from the
American Council of Life Insurance were afraid of the Hawaii law becoming a "precedent
for federally mandated benefits").
133. 1982 House Hearings,supra note 118, at 94.
134. Id. at 96.
135. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(5)(A) (1988) (exempting HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 393-1 through
393-51).
136. Fox & Schaffer, supra note 129, at 249.
137. Representative (now Senator) Dan Akaka noted that when Congress passed ERISA
in 1974, Hawaii had just enacted its law. 1982 House Hearings,supra note 118, at 3 (statement
of Rep. Akaka). He argued that Congress could not have been aware of the potential to
preempt in this case. Id. This argument was echoed by Sen. Matsunaga during earlier floor
debate:
It... seems reasonable to assume that Congress had no specific knowledge of the
Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act ...under consideration by the Hawaii State
Legislature since 1971. For, if it did, Congress would have surely made specific
reference to the Nation's first statewide, mandatory, basic comprehensive health
insurance law for employees ....
Id. at 120 (statement of Sen. Matsunaga); see also 137 CONG. REC. S2932, S2933 (daily ed.
Mar 7, 1991) (noting Sen. Akaka's statement that Hawaii's exemption was "not prospective
and only permitted the State to require the specific benefits set forth in its 1974 statute"); S.
Rep. No. 646, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 18 (1982) (noting that congressional preemption of
Hawaii's health system was "inadvertent"); supra note 80 and accompanying text (discussing
exemptions to ERISA).
138. "The amendment made by this section shall not be considered a precedent with
respect to extending such amendment to any other State law." Pub. L. No. 97-473, § 301(b),
96 Stat. 2605, 2612 (1983) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (1988)). See Fox & Schaffer, supra
note 129, at 250 (discussing significance of the express statement of intent).
139. Fox & Schaffer, supra note i29, at 246.
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2. Efforts to Expand the Mandate and Interest Group Opposition
Since 1983, the state has sought to expand its limited ERISA exemption.
There are a number of reasons for this. First, "a small percentage of
[Hawaii's] population remains uninsured."' 4 ° This may have raised concerns about the efficacy of the initial state plan. "In addition, there is
significant variation in the coverage available to beneficiaries of ...the
[state] program and the employer and Medicaid plans."' 4 1 Finally, the
state "has not been immune from the national trend of rising health care
14 2

costs."'

Hawaii officials have argued that the current waiver "freezes [the state]
in time."'' 43 In 1991, Senator Dan Akaka noted that the Prepaid Health
Care Act was over seventeen years old and needed substantive changes to
ensure its continued success. 14 4 Congress, he reasoned, should "allow a
State that has been at the forefront of innovative approaches to health
better reflect the needs of today's population
care to make changes 1which
45
and their employers."'
Both business and labor interests have consistently opposed further
exemptions to ERISA. Those opposed to extending Hawaii's exemption
often make the argument that this would lead Congress down a slippery
slope.' 46 Commenting on the prospects of ERISA waivers in another case,
one observer noted that employers worry about the financial and adminis1 47
trative costs of dealing "with 50 different sets of benefits regulations.
The ERISA Industry Committee (ERIC), which represents large employers sponsoring a range of employee benefit plans, is one of the most
significant opponents of "incremental" state reform. 148 According to ERIC,
from providing
state innovation will increase costs and "prevent employers 149
uniform benefits to their employees on a nationwide basis.

140.

STATES RESPOND,

supra note 60, at 31.

141. Id.
142. Id. at 28.
143. Telephone Interview with Rocky Finseth, Legislative Assistant, Office of the State of
Hawaii (Feb. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Finseth Interview].
144. 137 CONG. REC. S2933 (daily ed. Mar 7, 1991). Specifically, the state sought to
modify the mandated benefit package, require coverage for dependents, and update the
cost-sharing formula for insurance premiums. STATES RESPOND, supra note 60, at 31, 32.
145. 137 CONG. REC. S2933 (daily ed. Mar. 7, 1991).
146. Telephone Interview with Cora Yamamoto, Legislative Aide to Senator Daniel K.
Akaka (Feb. 22, 1993) [hereinafter Yamamoto Interview].
147. Mike McKee, Health Care Initiative May Be DOA, RECORDER, Oct. 20, 1992, at 1
(quoting Robert Solomon, a lawyer specializing in employee benefits).
148. See, e.g., Oversight on ERISA Preemption, supra note 79 (statement of Robert S.
Stone) (employer-sponsored plans benefit over 60% of population).
149. Id. Indeed, according to Stone, ERISA doesn't stand in the way of state reform; it
merely prevents states from interfering with employers who already provide health benefits.

Id.
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Unions, on the other hand, worry "that they will get fewer benefits" if
states are allowed to impose their own mandates.' 5 ° The AFL-CIO has
expressed concerns about the ability of states to ensure that benefit levels
do not erode under an ERISA "waiver" scheme.1 51 In addition, the union
argues that state-based reform would result in the proliferation of "extremely regressive taxes" in order to finance these proposals.' 52 Because of
the intense politics surrounding the law, an ERISA waiver
could "take
1 53
years to accomplish" and "a lot of money.., to achieve."
While "nobody cared" about health care reform at the national level for
a number of years, interest in Congress renewed in 1992.154 Presumably,
much of its new-found interest was due to the visibility of a national
1 55
campaign and the seemingly intractable problems at the state level.
Several factors made the Hawaii waiver more politically feasible during
that time. First, ERISA had become a "lightning rod" for interest groups
and states. 156 More states were recognizing that the federal law posed a
barrier to reform efforts.1 57 More importantly, in 1992 the political timing
was right.1 5 8 Congress was prepared to enact a tax bill1 59 during the later
stages of the presidential campaign, but it soon became apparent that
then-President Bush intended to veto it, so additional provisions were
slowly tacked onto the bill prior to passage. 60 Among these was the
expanded Hawaii waiver.
The waiver, which was not in either version of the original bill, 6 1 was
added in conference. 6 2 These circumstances indicate that the "surprise
element" should not be discounted. 6 3 In other words, the maneuver
minimized interest group opposition. Its inclusion in the conference report
150. McKee, supra note 147, at 1.
151. Oversight on ERISA Preemption, supra note 79 (statement of Calvin Johnson, Legislative Representative, AFL-CIO).
152. Id. at 8, 9.
153. McKee, supra note 147, at 1 (quoting Judy Martin-Holland, a spokesperson for the
California Nurses Association).
154. Finseth Interview, supra note 143.
155. Id; see also supra Part III.
156. Finseth Interview, supra note 143.
157. See Oversight on ERISA Preemption, supra note 79 (statement of Rep. Williams)
(claiming that ERISA overrides states' attempts to reform health care).
158. Yamamoto Interview, supra note 146.

159. The Revenue Act of 1992, H.R. 11, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
160. Finseth Interview, supra note 143. Constituents may be pleased if provisions for

which they sought congressional approval appear in a bill, even if the bill is not signed by the
President, because "making it" onto a bill highlights their issue and helps cement relationships with their congressional allies.
161. See 138 CONG. REC. H12,582 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (original bill without waiver

provision).
162. H.R. 11, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991) (providing in Section 10213 a broad exemption
from ERISA for the Hawaii Prepaid Health Care Act from ERISA, as long as coverage
remained at or above current levels).
163. Yamamoto Interview, supra note 146.

19931

HEALTH CARE REFORM AND FEDERALISM

should be seen more as a challenge to the Bush administration than as a
serious attempt to provide Hawaii with more flexibility. The conference
report was pocket vetoed 6 4 by President Bush. Hawaii still faces signifito its request, and the prospects of another waiver seem
cant opposition
65
slight. 1

B.

OREGON MEDICAID EXPANSION

Oregon's path to obtain approval for state reform further attests to the
limits of the Supreme Court's "structural" theory of federalism. Oregon
sought to expand access to care and to become a national "model" by
broadening its Medicaid program, enacting an employer mandate to provide health insurance, and establishing a state insurance fund. Because the
proposed reforms involved major changes to the structure of Medicaid,
Oregon required federal approval to implement its plan.' 6 6 This section
outlines the basic provisions of the Oregon plan and analyzes the process
the state used to seek federal approval in Congress.
1. The Oregon Basic Health Services Act
The Oregon Basic Health Services Act, passed in 1989, extended access
to health coverage to the state's uninsured residents. 6 7 The law included
three components:
(1) an extension of Medicaid eligibility to cover more people;
(2) an employer mandate requiring businesses to contribute to a state
fund or provide health insurance to their employees; and
to obtain insurance because of
(3) a risk pool to cover those unable
1 68
preexisting medical conditions.
164. A "pocket veto" is a veto effected by a president's retention of a bill, its "return...

as approved or rejected within the time fixed by law being prevented by the adjournment of
the law-making body." JAMES A. BALLENTINE, BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 957 (1969);
see U. S. CONST. art. I, § 7 (pocket veto provision).
165. The House Ways and Means Committee included Hawaii's language, similar to that
in H.R. 11, in its final report of President Clinton's tax bill. H.R. 2141, 103d Cong., 1st Sess.

(1993). This provision was rejected by the House Rules Committee in the final version of the
bill, H.R. 2264, which was subsequently approved by the House. H.R. 2264, 103d Cong., 1st

Sess. (1993). One explanation for dropping Hawaii's request for an extended waiver is that it
was "clearly not a revenue provision." HEALTH CARE POL'Y REP., May 24, 1993, at 527.
166. See supra note 113 and accompanying text (explaining that provisions of Medicaid
law can be waived by Secretary for experimental demonstrations); see also David P. Hamilton, Oregon's Plan Comes to the Capital, 249 SCIENCE 469 (1990) (noting briefly the steps

taken by the state).
167. OR. REV. STAT. § 414.036 et seq. (1989). Oregon's uninsured population was estimated to exceed 400,000 persons at that time. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT,
SUMMARY EVALUATION OF THE OREGON MEDICAID PROPOSAL 1 (1992) [hereinafter OTA].
168. STATES RESPOND, supra note 60, at 39; see also OTA, supra note 167, at 2 (summariz-

ing the components of the Oregon Basic Health Services Act of 1989).
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The Medicaid component of the plan involved expanding services to ' all
169
"legal state residents with incomes below the [federal poverty level]."
State officials emphasized Medicaid because federal matching funds would
offset some of the costs of expanding services to the uninsured. 7 0 Oregon's
existing Medicaid program excluded certain groups, such as single adults,
and generally limited eligibility to those whose incomes were at or below
fifty percent of the federal poverty level. 1 ' This component was particu72
larly controversial because of its public perception as a rationing scheme. 1
To extend coverage, the state essentially determined that some services
would not be paid for by Medicaid. A state commission compiled a list of
health services "ranked by priority, from the most important to the least
important, representing the comparative benefits of each service to the
entire population to be served.' ' 17 3 The state legislature, assessing the level
of available funds during the budget cycle, would determine the level of
services available. 174 Services above the cut-off point would make up the
standard benefits package and be eligible for Medicaid reimbursement.
2. Efforts to Obtain a Waiver and Interest Group Opposition
Oregon required federal approval to implement its reform plan, but its
appeal was eventually rejected by Congress. By touting itself as a laboratory, Oregon played right into the interest group politics of health reform,
an arena in which the structure of federalism does states little good. What

169. OTA, supra note 167, at 1 (footnote omitted) (noting that in 1992, the federal
poverty level was $11,570 annually for a family of three). According to Oregon, the expansion would have added approximately 120,600 people to the Medicaid rolls by the fifth year

of the program, or 96,400 if the employer mandate were in effect. Id. The point of expanding
services in this manner was to "de-link Medicaid from the welfare program." Oregon
Medicaid Rationing Experiment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health and the Environment
of the House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1991) [hereinafter
1991 Hearings] (statement of Jean I. Thorne, Director of Oregon's Medicaid program).
170. STATES RESPOND, supra note 60, at 44. For fiscal year 1991, Oregon's matching rate
was 63.5%. For fiscal year 1993, the projected rate is 62.4%. MEDICAID SOURCE BOOK, supra

note 66, at 485.
171. STATES RESPOND, supra note 60, at 39. "Certain groups have higher Medicaid income
eligibility caps." Id. at 39 n.33.

172. For a discussion of the ethical problems raised by the Oregon plan, see Daniel
Callahan, Ethics and PrioritySetting in Oregon, HEALTH AFF., Summer 1991, at 78 (framing in

a moral context the plan's explicit goals and the consequences of its implementation); see
also Robert Steinbrook & Bernard Lo, The Oregon Medicaid Demonstration Project-WillIt
Promote Adequate Medical Care, NEW ENG. J. MED., Jan. 30, 1992, at 342 (noting the

difficulty of setting priorities and practicing medicine under the Oregon scheme); William B.
Schwartz & Henry J. Aaron, The Achilles Heel of Health Care Rationing, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,

1990, at A17 (criticizing the process of "ranking" medical services because it ignores those
individual patient characteristics that affect procedural outcomes).
173. OR. REV. STAT. § 414.720(3) (Supp. 1992). The Office of Technology Assessment
found that the list favored preventive services and services used primarily by women and
children. OTA, supra note 167, at 5.
174. OR. REV. STAT. § 414.735 (Supp. 1992).
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happened to Oregon demonstrates the limits of states' influence in Congress and their lack of advantages against national interest groups in the
federal system.
When Oregon officials approached the Health Care Financing Administration 175 to inquire about a demonstration waiver, the agency responded
cautiously, noting that the waiver process had never before been used to
eliminate mandated services. 17 6 With the support of Republican Senator
Bob Packwood of Oregon, who served on the powerful Finance Committee, 177 Oregon then sought to obtain a waiver from Congress.
Senator Packwood argued vigorously for approval of the waiver. He
believed the plan would accomplish a great deal for his state.17 8 Throughout the debate, Packwood stressed that Oregon was "a willing laboratory
in which to test new ideas., 179 Not only would the plan itself serve as a
model for health policy, it had been developed in a manner that Packwood
believed should be replicated in other states. "Perhaps the greatest strength
of Oregon's plan," he noted, was the "public debate and consensusbuilding over health care needs and values" that took place during its
formation.1 80 These arguments in favor of the state as a laboratory were
echoed by Oregon's other supporters in Congress. 18
Late in the budget process for fiscal year 1990, Senator Packwood
inserted language into the Senate Finance Committee Report on the
Omnibus Reconciliation Bill that would have authorized the Oregon plan
with respect to Medicaid.' 8 2 When he took this first step, "virtually all of

175. The Health Care Financing Administration is responsible for overseeing the Medicare and Medicaid programs. See generally THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MANUAL 327
(1992).
176. Brown, supra note 2, at 33.
177. Id. at 41. The state's plan was "very important" to Sen. Packwood. Telephone

Interview with Roy Ramthun, Senate Finance Committee Staff Member (Feb. 18, 1993)
[hereinafter Ramthun Interview]. Such enthusiastic support from a key senator would
probably be touted by supporters of the Court's theory as a sign that federalism works.
178. Ramthun Interview, supra note 177. Noting that "we are already rationing [health
care] today," Sen. Packwood asked Rep. Waxman's subcommittee to focus instead on the
expansion of services to "those 450,000 Oregonians going without health care," who would

be covered by the plan. Sen. Robert Packwood, Oregon's Sensible Health-Care Reform,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 18, 1991, at 18.
179. Packwood, supra note 178, at 18; see also Federal Government Refuses to Approve
Oregon Medicaid Reform, UPI, Aug. 3, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File
[hereinafter Federal Government Refuses] (noting that Sen. Packwood believed the plan
"offered an opportunity to test an approach to health care reform that would be less drastic
than adopting a single national health insurance system").
180. 1991 Hearings,supra note 169, at 53 (statement of Sen. Packwood).
181. "Many of our greatest programs ... were begun by individual States which identified
a problem and set out to find a solution." Id. at 54 (statement of Sen. Hatfield); see also Rep.
Ron Wyden, The Oregon Basic Health Plan, ROLL CALL, May 4, 1992, at 24 (noting the
opportunity for Oregon "to become a laboratory for the nation").
182. See 135 CONG. REC. S13,194 (daily ed. Oct. 12, 1989); see also Hamilton, supra note
166, at 469.

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 82:159

[Oregon's] heavyweight interest groups ... stood firm in support."' 8 3 Despite appearances, however, key opponents immediately began to rally
against the plan. Some considered Packwood's maneuver an illegitimate
circumvention of the normal Medicaid waiver process. 8 4 Others responded on policy grounds. Senator Al Gore circulated a "Dear Colleague"
letter pledging to fight the waiver if it reached the Senate floor.'8 5 Representative Henry Waxman, chairman of the House subcommittee with jurisdiction over the Medicaid program, "intimated that he had concerns about
the fairness of the proposal." ' 6
All nonbudgetary language, including the Oregon waiver, was eventually
stripped from the final report before it was sent to the Senate floor. 187 Its
inclusion, however, had already galvanized the players. Oregon's waiver
was seen as a step in the wrong direction nationally, meriting a broadbased attack from national interests. 88
Several important groups, such as the Children's Defense Fund, the
American Academy of Pediatrics, the National Association of Community
Health Centers, the U.S. Catholic Conference, and the National Association of Children's Hospitals, lobbied against the state.' 8 9 Critics suggested
holding congressional hearings in Oregon and planned additional publicity
about the measure targeted to mobilize "a range of groups ... to cultivate
a high degree of... discomfort with the Oregon plan."19
State officials eventually decided to seek a waiver from the Department
of Health and Human Services. An administrative waiver would allow
Oregon to bypass congressional opposition because it would probably be
more difficult to pass a law nullifying the waiver and then to override a
potential presidential veto, than it would be to thwart its passage by
legislation. 91 Plan supporters argued that it gave the Bush administration

183. Brown, supra note 2, at 42. National organizations "hesitated to break public ranks

with, and thereby embarrass, their Oregon affiliates." Id.
184. See Hamilton, supra note 166, at 469 (noting objection of committee staff members).
185. Brown, supra note 2, at 34. Senator Gore later argued that the values implied in the

Medicaid program had a special claim on Congress:
Oregon has made a tragic choice and a horrible mistake in responding to the plight
of the uninsured by developing a scheme that takes from the poor, and only the

poor, to help the poor, a scheme that preys on the limited political clout and
powerlessness of poor women and poor children....
1991 Hearings,supra note 169, at 56 (statement of Sen. Gore).
186. Brown, supra note 2, at 34. Rep. Waxman chairs the Subcommittee on Health and the

Environment of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
187. Id. at 33. Roy Ramthun also confirmed that members were especially sensitive to special "pet project" legislation at that point in the debate. Ramthun Interview, supra note 177.

188. Brown, supra note 2, at 43 (noting that "Oregon's waiver would be a powerful
precedent" for giving wide discretion to the states).
189. Id. at 34.
190. Id. at 43.
191. Ramthun Interview, supra note 177.
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an opportunity to show how "serious" it was about health care reform. 9 2
Meanwhile, Representative Waxman and Senator Gore highlighted the
national implications of the state's reform plan in their continued opposition. Waxman warned that Oregon's model, even if well-intentioned, could
be used by other states "to decimate the Medicaid program."'19 3 Gore
deflected arguments that the state be allowed to serve as a laboratory by

arguing that "[m]uch more is at stake than simply Oregon's ability to steer
its own course on health policy."' 9 4

Health and Human Services Secretary Louis Sullivan eventually refused
the waiver request. 195 The decision was seen to be out of line with the
administration's view that states should be allowed "more latitude to

experiment with social policy."'

96

However, election year politics seemed

to play no small role in the outcome.'

97

Thus, Oregon, like Hawaii, faced enormous obstacles in its efforts to
lobby Congress-obstacles that are not taken into consideration in the
Supreme Court's federalism framework. In particular, the Court has failed
to account for the significant role played by national interest groups in the
political process. Congress is no more amenable to state interests than it is
to interests that are not given a "structural" role in the constitutional
scheme.

192. See, e.g., Wyden, supra note 181, at 24 (stating that "here's one chance for the Bush
Administration to show the country it's serious about health care reform").
193. 1991 Hearings, supra note 169, at 94. These hearings were held after Oregon applied
for a waiver from the Health Care Finance Administration.
194. Id. at 55 (statement of Sen. Gore). Presumably, Sen. Gore was concerned with the
"rationing" implications of the plan. See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
195. Secretary Sullivan believed that the Oregon plan would discriminate against the
disabled, in violation of the recently passed Americans With Disabilities Act (ADA). The
Act "leaves no question that those with disabilities must enjoy the same treatment under the
law as other Americans." Federal Government Refuses, supra note 179 (quoting Secretary
Sullivan). According to the Secretary, the process of ranking used to develop the Medicaid
service package was premised on a notion that " 'the value of the life of a person with a
disability is less than the value of a person without a disability.' " Robert Pear, Plan to Ration
Health Care Is Rejected by Government, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 1992, at A8 (quoting Secretary
Sullivan).
196. Michael Abramowitz, Quashing the Oregon Plan, WASH. POST, Aug. 11, 1992, (Health),
at Z7.
197. See id. (quoting an analyst who believed the decision was essentially "election-year
maneuvering," pointing out that the argument regarding the ADA was not raised until a few
days before Secretary Sullivan's letter, and arguing that "[a]pproving the plan could have ...
left Bush exposed to attacks from Democratic presidential nominee Bill Clinton and his
running mate Al Gore ... [who] has been one of the most vociferous opponents of the
Oregon plan").
Oregon was recently granted approval for its revised waiver application by the Clinton
administration. See Letter from Sec. Donna Shalala to Governor Barbara Roberts, in N.A.A.G.
Briefing Book, supra note 72, at 49. The approval was predicated on a number of terms,
including a reranking of condition-treatment pairs without utilizing symptom descriptions
that possibly violate the ADA. See Health Care FinancingAdministration Special Terms and
Conditions, in N.A.A.G. Briefing Book, supra note 72, at 53.
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CONCLUSION

The case studies in Part IV demonstrate that the Supreme Court has not
responded adequately to the modern realities of federalism. The Court is
poorly served by the Garcia decision, which is premised on a very limited
understanding of the role of states in the political process. As these case
studies show, states may be understood to function like interest groups in
the legislative process; the structure of the federal system does not enhance state powers. In fact, states seeking autonomy as "laboratories of
democracy" face difficult challenges from competing national interest
groups. Unfortunately, states are not sufficiently armed for this battle.
State reform is essential because, in the end, health care policy choices
must reflect the consensus of the political community. States represent the
clearest form of "community" in our federal system. It is easier to build
consensus on a smaller scale. Lasting health care reform will not come
without the binding force of community that is only possible at the state
level.
Such reform, however, presupposes accountability in the policymaking
process. The Supreme Court should assume a new role that ensures
political accountability in the federal system. In New York v. United States, 198
the Court recognized that federalism requires it to ensure that Congress
remains accountable to state voters without entangling state government in
its regulatory processes.' 99 This willingness to recognize a defect in the
relationship between states and the federal government should be extended.
The Court's approach to federal-state conflicts should not be wholly
deferential to the political process in Congress because that process does
not always represent state interests. There should be a presumption that
states are not adequately represented in the political process when interest
group activity overwhelms the accountability of Congress to the states, as it
does in the area of health care reform. In this case, the Court's reliance on
the "political structure" of federalism is misplaced.
In its new posture of judicial skepticism, the Court should give credence
to arguments that state interests are ignored in the legislative process.

198. 112 S. Ct. 2408 (1992).
199. Id. at 2428, 2435 (invalidating provisions of a federal law that required states to take

title to low-level radioactive waste or to regulate in accordance with Congressional strictures). The Court noted that:

If the citizens of New York ... do not consider that [a certain law is] in their best
interest, they may elect state officials who share their view. That view can always be

preempted under the Supremacy Clause if it is contrary to the national view, but in
such a case it is the Federal Government that makes the decision in full view of the
public, and it will be federal officials that suffer the consequences if the decision

turns out to be detrimental or unpopular.
Id. at 2424.
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When the political market has failed, the Court is justified in intervening
on behalf of states. 2° Such intervention may include a review of legislative
history to determine how state interests were received, and whether Congress considered adequately the impact of its actions at the state level.
Although states do not have rights in the same sense that citizens do, a
proper understanding of federalism requires that states, as institutional
participants, be respected in the political process. Such respect must come
first from the judicial branch. Only when the Court recognizes this will
states truly serve as "laboratories of democracy."

200. John Hart Ely introduced the notion of "market failure" to argue that representative
processes may be served by court intervention. ELY, supra note 20, at 102-03 (1980).

